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Electricity Restructuring: The Ontario Experience
Abstract
Over the last decade or so, a number of jurisdictions throughout the developed and developing world have
embarked upon major competitively oriented restructurings of their electricity industries. Ontario has
recently joined this list. Historically, Ontario Hydro has been the largest state-owned enterprise in Canada,
having been created by the government of Ontario in 1906 initially to construct and operate a provincial
transmission grid which would deliver power from privately owned hydro-electric generators to various
municipally owned distribution systems. Ontario Hydro quickly broadened its vision to embrace a province-
wide transmission grid and the progressive acquisition of most privately owned generating facilities in the
province, as well as the construction of massive new generating facilities of its own. Ontario Hydro currently
generates about 90% of the electric power sold in the province, about 60% of which is generated by nuclear
facilities built in the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout its history, Ontario Hydro has occupied a unique and in
many respects dominating political and economic influence in the province. It has rarely been far from the
public eye, and major cost over-runs in system expansion precipitated the first of many commissions or like
inquiries as early as 1920. By 1923, debts incurred on behalf of Ontario Hydro amounted to one-half of the
entire provincial debt. Despite frequent public inquiries over the years into aspects of its operations, the basic
vertically integrated, public monopoly structure of the industry that emerged in its first 20 years of operations
has remained intact until very recently. The current Ontario government has now committed itself to
wholesale and retail competition in electricity by the year 2000 and has restructured Ontario Hydro into two
state-owned successor companies constituted under the Ontario Business Corporations Act. One of these will
own the high voltage transmission grid and the other will own the generating facilities subject to
commitments to transfer effective control of these facilities to private competitors so as to reduce Ontario
Hydro's market share to 35% of price setting plant output within 3 1/2 years of market opening and 35% of all
generating output sold in the province within 10 years. Significant rationalization of the almost 300
municipally owned local distribution utilities (LDCS or MEUS) in Ontario through amalgamation or
privatization is anticipated (and is already occurring, albeit slowly).
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I. THE REFORM PROCESS
Over the last decade or so, a number of jurisdictions throughout
the developed and developing world have embarked upon major
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competitively oriented restructurings of their electricity indus-
tries.' Ontario has recently joined this list. Historically, Ontario
Hydro has been the largest state-owned enterprise in Canada, having
been created by the government of Ontario in 1906 initially to
construct and operate a provincial transmission grid which would
deliver power from privately owned hydro-electric generators to
various municipally owned distribution systems. Ontario Hydro
quickly broadened its vision to embrace a province-wide transmis-
sion grid and the progressive acquisition of most privately owned
generating facilities in the province, as well as the construction of
massive new generating facilities of its own. Ontario Hydro cur-
rently generates about 90% of the electric power sold in the prov-
ince, about 60% of which is generated by nuclear facilities built in
the 1970s and 1980s. Throughout its history, Ontario Hydro has
occupied a unique and in many respects dominating political and
economic influence in the province.2 It has rarely been far from the
public eye, and major cost over-runs in system expansion precipi-
tated the first of many commissions or like inquiries as early as
1920. By 1923, debts incurred on behalf of Ontario Hydro amounted
to one-half of the entire provincial debt. Despite frequent public
inquiries over the years into aspects of its operations, the basic
vertically integrated, public monopoly structure of the industry that
emerged in its first 20 years of operations has remained intact until
very recently. The current Ontario government has now committed
itself to wholesale and retail competition in electricity by the year
2000 and has restructured Ontario Hydro into two state-owned suc-
cessor companies constituted under the Ontario Business Corpora-
tions Act.3 One of these will own the high voltage transmission
grid and the other will own the generating facilities subject to
1. For reviews of the comparative experience, see OECD Report on Regulatory Reform,
''The Electricity Sector" (Paris, 1997), vol. I; Sally Hunt and Graham Shuttleworth,
Competition and Choice in Electricity (N.Y., John Wiley & Sons, 1996); Paul Joskow,
"Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector"
(1997), J. of Economic Perspectives 120 and Larry Ruff, "Competitive Electricity Mar-
kets: Why They Are Working and How To Improve Them" (NERA, San Francisco, May
16,1999).
2. See Neil Freeman, The Politics ofPower: Ontario Hydro and Its Government 1906·1995
(Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1996) and Ron Daniels and Michael Trebilcock,
"The Future of Ontario Hydro: A Review of Structural and Regulatory Options" in
Ron Daniels, ed., Ontario Hydro at the Millennium: Has Monopoly's Moment Passed?
(Montreal, McGill-Queens Press, 1996).
3. R.S.O. 1990, c. 8.16.
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commitments to transfer effective control of these facilities to pri-
vate competitors so as to reduce Ontario Hydro's market share to
35% of price setting plant output within 3 1/2 years of market
opening and 35% of all generating output sold in the province within
10 years. Significant rationalization of the almost 300 municipally
owned local distribution utilities (LDCS or MEUS) in Ontario through
amalgamation or privatization is anticipated (and is already oc-
curring, albeit slowly).
What set of factors led to this dramatic change in policy? Over
the period 1991-1993, at a time of severe recession in the province,
Ontario Hydro's customers faced average rate increases ap-
proaching 30%, which provoked intense public outcries through-
out the province. Prior to the recent restructuring, Ontario Hydro's
debt, which the provincial government has guaranteed, amounted·
to about $35 billion, or about 30% of total provincial indebtedness.
In 1993, the corporation incurred a net loss after restructuring
charges of over $3.6 billion - the largest corporate loss in Cana-
dian history. Restructuring charges related to severance and redun-
dancy costs; write-downs related to assets recorded at values in
excess of market values and plant closure costs. In 1993, Ontario
Hydro reduced its full-time workforce by 24% from 29,600 to
22,600. In 1998, Ontario Hydro reported another write-down of
assets of over $6 billion as a prelude to restructuring. In the current
restructuring, the government estimates that following restructur-
ing, Ontario Hydro (and the provincial government) will face
about $20 billion in stranded debt and contingent liabilities that
future operating revenues will be unable to service. Currently,
eight of Ontario Hydro's 20 nuclear plants are out of service on
account of reliability problems.
With the benefit of hindsight, Ontario Hydro's difficulties can
be attributed to: (1) serious over-estimation of future demand; (2)
over-expansion of capacity and related borrowing with respect to
its nuclear facilities in the 1970s and 1980s (in part a federal-
provincial industrial strategy designed to promote the Canadian-
built CANDU reactor); (3) substantial cost over-runs and disappoint-
ing operating performance of a number of these facilities; (4) declin-
ing prices for substitute sources of energy, particularly natural gas,
and to a lesser extent oil. In addition, technological innovation in
generation has undermined traditional assumptions about minimum
efficient scale in electricity generation. Combined cycle gas turbines
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that entail a fraction of the capital costs of existing generating
facilities now hold out immediate prospects of power generation
at significantly lower average total cost than that of established
generating technology (along with dramatically lower environmen-
tal externalities). In addition, much more localized power generation
technology is rapidly developing, such as wind farms, fuel cells,
micro gas generators, photo-voltaic solar cells, etc. Much of this
new technology can be installed by end-users to serve their own
power needs and in some cases also to supply power to other end-
. users through the local distribution system.4 Clearly, this concatena-
tion of factors substantially undermined Ontario Hydro's political
and public credibility and the government policies that maintained
the vertically integrated public monopoly paradigm for almost a
century.
As the crisis with Ontario Hydro deepened in the early 1990s,
the newly elected Progressive Conservative government in late
1995 appointed a Task Force (commonly referred to as the Mac-
donald Task Force) with a mandate to explore options for a more
competitively structured Ontario electricity industry. The Task
Force held public consultations and meetings across the province,
commissioned research studies from experts and completed a
unanimous report within six months of commencing its delibera-
tions which contained a number of detailed recommendations and
options for moving to a more competitively structured electricity
industry in Ontario.s The Task Force was comprised of a former
federal Minister of Finance, Defence, and Energy as chairman, a
consulting engineer, the CEO of a major electrical product manufac-
turing company, an economist recently retired from an investment
bank, a former provincial Minister of Treasury, Municipal Affairs,
and Energy, a former municipal mayor and environmentalist, and a
professor of Economics. Following release of the Task Force report,
the government of Ontario spent a year preparing a White Paper6
against the backdrop of the Task Force report, in consultation with a
wide range of stakeholders, setting out some basic parameters for
restructuring the industry with the central policy objective being the
4. See e.g., Daniels and Trebilcock, 'The Future of Ontario Hydro", ibid., and Advisory
Committee to the Ontario Minister of Environment and Energy (the "Macdonald Task
Force" or "Task Force'}, A Frameworkfor Competition (1996).
5. Macdonald Task Force, A Frameworkfor Competition. ibid.
6. White Paper, Direction for Change: Charting a Course for Competitive Electricity and
Jobs in Ontario (Ministry of Energy, November 1997).
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introduction of both wholesale and retail competition by the year
2000. Following release of the White Paper, the Ontario government
appointed the Market Design Committee with a mandate to design
the detailed market rules for the introduction of wholesale competi-
tion in the province and to make detailed recommendations to the
government and the Ontario Energy Board (the industry regulator)
on the implementation of retail competition. The two authors of this
article were, respectively, Research Director and Chairman of the
Market Design Committee. Legislation providing for the restructur-
ing of the Ontario electricity industry was enacted by the Ontario
legislature in the fall of 1998, without major partisan conflict.1
The Market Design Committee ("MOC" or "the Committee") met
for the first time on February 13, 1998, and for the last time on
January 18, 1999. During its one-year mandate, the Committee
completed a considerable amount of work on the foundations for
Ontario's new electricity market consistent with the policy objec-
tives and directions set out in the government's White Paper. Specif-
ically the MDC delivered to the government:
• four quarterly reports, totalling almost 500 pages of analysis
and recommendations;
• over 300 pages of wholesale market rules;
• over 300 pages of research and advice to.the Ontario Energy
Board (OEB) relating to the design of the retail market;
• three self-standing reports from other technical panels and
their subpanels;
• an agreement with Ontario Power Generation Incorporated
(OPGI) on market power mitigation in the generation sector,
including a detailed proposal to implement it;
• a proposed Governance and Structure By-Law for the Inde-
pendent Electricity Market Operator (IMO); and
• a draft Operational Control Agreement between the IMO
and the transmission grid owner, Ontario Hydro Services
Company Incorporated (OHSCI)..
The Committee's work was completed on time and within budget
($10.5 million).
The MOC was composed of 14 members, who were chosen by the
Minister of Energy, Science and Technology to represent a broad
7. Electricity Act. 1998. s.o. 1998. c. 15. Sch. A.
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cross-section of interests in the electricity industry. It included repre-
sentatives of the transmission grid, Ontario Hydro's generation divi-
sion, local distribution companies, independent power producers,
industrial, commercial and residential consumers, environmental-
ists, and the natural gas industry. Where appropriate, members were
expected to consult with their constituencies. The Committee had a
non-voting executive comprised of a Chair (R. Daniels), two Vice-
chairs (D. Dewees and 1. Grant), and a Director of Research (M.
Trebilcock). Following a competition overseen by a process consul-
tant, the executive retained a leading international consulting firm
with expertise in many aspects of electricity restructuring including
first-hand experience with restructuring in many other jurisdictions.
The Committee met 39 times in full-day sessions. There was an
almost perfect attendance record. Members also attended a number
of workshops and participated on the technical panels and subpa-
nels that operated from mid-September to early December 1998.
A special weekend conference of international experts was orga-
nized by the Committee in the spring of 1998 in Toronto. The
conference provided members and the broader public with an
opportunity to interact with leading utility executives and regula-
tors from a number of electricity jurisdictions that are undergoing
restructuring including Norway, the U.K., Alberta, Australia, New
Zealand, Argentina and several U.S. electricity jurisdictions.
At one of the first meetings, the Committee defined and agreed
upon six criteria that would be used in evaluating proposals. The
criteria were not used in a mechanical or rigorous way, but were
often invoked to focus members' attention on the real trade-offs
that had to be made. The criteria were as follows: (1) efficiency;
(2) fairness; (3) reliability; (4) transparency; (5) robustness; and
(6) enforceability.
Committee decisions were made by "substantial consensus",
which normally meant at least 10 of the 14 votes were in favour.
Almost all issues were resolved with at least this degree of consen-
sus - indeed, mostwere endorsed unanimously.
The Committee met in plenary session for the most contentious
issues. Starting in the second quarter, it also met in subcommittee
format for more focused discussion of particular areas, such as
wholesale, retail, and T&D (transmission and distribution). Mem-
bers' expert advisors were permitted to attend subcommittee ses-
sions and to participate freely in the discussions.
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Officials from the Ontario Energy Board and what was then
Central Market Operations (CMO), Ontario Hydro (now the Inde-
pendent Market Operator) also participated as expert analysts and
advisors. CMO staff played an especially important role on the tech-
nical panels and subpanels and made numerous presentations to the
MDC. Staff from the Ministries of Finance and Energy, Science
and Technology attended MDC meetings regularly as observers. The
committee benefited from presentations by the federal Competition
Bureau, the OEB, the Ministry of Energy, Science and Technology
and the Ministry of Finance and its external advisors.
The Committee sketched out a "high-level" design for the mar-
ket in its first two interim reports. It then established a number of
technical panels and subpanels to assist with the development of
more detailed rules in the third and fourth quarters. The panels and
subpanels focused on specific issues or areas of interest. In total,
there were six panels and 20 subpanels involving more than 100
people, most of whom were "seconded" to the market design
project by a host of sponsoring organizations and companies span-
ning all parts of the market and all parts of Ontario.
The panels and subpanels contributed by conducting research
and developing recommendations on specific issues, consistent
with the Committee's evaluative criteria and high-level design.
After debate by the full MDC, panel recommendations relating to
the wholesale market rules went to a rules drafting team for transla-
tion into legal text, while those relating to the retail market and
certain aspects of transmission were accepted for transmittal to the
OEB.
In addition to drawing in a large number of experts, the Commit-
tee sought to maintain a transparent process through the publica-
tion of comprehensive interim reports and the maintenance of an
Internet website. Key papers and minutes were posted on the
website, and stakeholder responses to this material were circulated
to MDC members.
The Committee's recommendations took a number of forms:
• advice to the government regarding legislation (prior to pas-
sage of the Electricity Act, 1998) and advice which may
influence future regulations;
• recommendations incorporated directly into the wholesale
market rules that have now been approved in principle by
the Minister; and
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• advice to the OEB, which has statutory responsibility for
deciding the matters in question.
II. THE MARKET DESIGN
We summarize below some of the key features of the market
that the MDC designed. It is obviously not possible to provide a
detailed summary of all the Committee's work, given the number
and complexity of the issues dealt with.
1. The Independent Electricity Market Operator
One of the MDC's first tasks was to recommend a governance
structure for the new IMO organization that had been proposed in the
Government's White Paper to manage the wholesale spot market
and perform the dispatch function. The MDC had to spell out in detail
the full range of functions that the IMO would need to perform.
Among other things, this task involved defining the relationships
among the !MO, the OEB and the transmission owners.
The MDC recommended a hybrid structure for the IMO Board,
consisting of five independent directors (which the government
subsequently increased to six), nine stakeholder directors, and the
!MO'S chief executive officer. It also recommended a distribution of
stakeholder directors by sector (broadly similar to the composition
of the MDC itself), a process for appointing directors and the chair,
voting rules for the board, a structure of decision-making panels for
the corporation, and many other details.8 The governance recom-
mendations were relied on extensively in the drafting of Bill 35, the
Electricity Act, 1998, which was introduced in the Legislature on
June 9, 1998. With the passage of the Bill (on October 30, 1998),
the IMO has now been established. Subsequently, the MDC developed
a detailed Governance and Structure By-law for the !MO. The by-
law spells out critical details of how the corporation will operate.9
The draft by-law will be reviewed, possibly amended, and approved
by the IMO board prior to being approved by the Minister.
The MDC did considerable work in the final quarter on principles
for the IMO tariff. The MDC'S recommendation was that the IMO'S
costs for administering the market should be recovered through a
8. First Interim Report of MDC, March 31, 1998.
9. Final Report of MDC, January 29. 1999, c. 5.
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modest registration or licence fee, plus a simple charge to all buyers
based on the amount of energy they purchase.
The MDC recommended that the IMO should have day-to-day
operational control of the transmission network through negotiated
contracts with the transmission owners. In the model proposed, the
IMO has clear and unambiguous responsibility for determining sys-
tem capabilities as well as the real-time dispatch of generation and
loads. This approach ensures non-discriminatory access to transmis-
sion and provides for efficient and reliable operation of the network.
Transmission owners manage their assets and receive a regulated
tariff. This approach was adopted in the Electricity Act, 1998. 10
The operating agreement between the IMO and transmission own-
ers must deal with a number of issues including the duration of the
contract, the specific assets to be included and their characteristics,
provisions regarding planned outages of equipment, provisions re-
garding emergencies, provisions regarding liability for damages and
provisions relating to the schedule of payments from the IMO to the
owners. The CMO and Ontario Hydro Services Company Incorpo-
rated have negotiated a draft operating agreement. 1I The agreement
was developed pursuant to principles enunciated earlier by the MDC,
and is likely to become the model for similar agreements between
the IMO and other transmission owners in the province. This area of
the MOC'S work required it to focus, as well, on the responsibilities
of the IMO, the OEB and the transmission companies in relation to
system expansion. The MDC'S recommendations specify the process
by which transmission investment decisions would be made in the
short to medium term. The IMO's role is to provide long-term fore-
casts about system requirements and to assess the security and
reliability implications of various competing proposals. The OEB
considers the costs and benefits of potential transmission expansions
and provides plan approval. Its assessment will include potential
competing investments in generation, if such proposals are forth-
coming. 12
2. Market Power Mitigation
When the electricity market opens in November 2000, Ontario
Power Generation Incorporated will likely control about 90% of
to. Section 26(2) of the Electricity Act, 1998 provides for certain exemptions from the
requirement to provide non-discriminatory access.
II. Final Report of MDC, c. 4 (Exhibit "AU).
12. Second Interim Report of MDC, June 30, 1998, c.7; Third Interim Report of MDC,
October 8, 1998, c. 2.
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domestic generation capacity. In an unregulated market, where
there are by definition no price controls, OPGI would be able to
push up the price to consumers and perhaps adopt strategies to
effectively prevent new competitive generation companies from
becoming established in the province. The MDC strongly favoured
an ex ante "structural" solution to this market power problem.
Accepting that immediate divestiture was not an available op-
tion, given the position taken by the government in its White Paper
that beyond creating two successor corporations to Ontario Hydro
no further reorganization of Ontario Hydro's assets was presently
contemplated, the MDC advanced a three-part plan in its Second
Quarterly Report involving vesting contracts to control monopolis-
tic pricing, "de-control" of Ontario Hydro's price-setting plants, and
OEB oversight of the targets as part of its more general responsibility
for monitoring the structural evolution of the market. 13 Extensive
discussions were held with Ontario Hydro over the summer of
1998, resulting in significant refinements to this initial plan. The
framework agreement reached with Ontario Hydro was endorsed
unanimously by the MDC membership in September 1998.14 The
government approved the framework in November 1998, and gave
the MDC and Ontario Hydro a mandate to complete the details of the
proposals. IS
The MDC recommended a price/revenue cap that works over a
transition period to prevent OPGI from exercising its market power
to bid up prices. Briefly, an average annual cap of 3.8 cents per
kilowatt hour would apply on 90% of OPGI'S estimated domestic
energy sales. If the market price is higher than this, OPGI would
receive only 3.8 cents and the difference would be rebated by the
IMO to all Ontario customers. Other generators would be paid what-
ever the market price happens to be (or the bilateral price that they
had agreed to if they had entered into a bilateral contract). This
arrangement removes most of the incentive for OPGI to exercise its
market power through "pricing up".
Second, the MDC recommended that OPGI be required to transfer
effective control of output so as to reduce its effective control of the
price-setting (i.e. marginal) plants (mostly fossil) in the Ontario
market to 35% within 42 months of market opening, and its share of
13. Second Interim Report of MIX:. c. 2.
14. Third Interim Report of MIX:. c. I.
IS. Final Report of MIX:. c. 2.
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the overall Ontario market to 35% within 10 years of market open-
ing. The agreement with Ontario Hydro on these market share reduc-
tion targets was an historic moment for the electricity industry in
Ontario in moving from monopoly to competition.
OPGI will have flexibility in determining how to meet its de-
control targets. The MDC favoured asset sales and long-term leases,
but noted that other techniques may also be possible. The essential
point is to transfer the ability to influence price from OPGI to some
other party. It is worth reiterating that the de-control numbers are
"must meet" targets. Indeed, the MDC expressed the strong desire
and hope that these targets can be met well within the specified time
frames.
Third, complementing the de-control plan, the MDC also recom-
mended that Ontario Hydro Services Company Incorporated (the
transmission grid) make a "best efforts" commitment to increase
inter-tie capacity with neighbouring jurisdictions by 50% within
three years of market opening.
The fourth major element of the market power mitigation strat-
egy is regular reviews by the OEB. The MDC recommended several
OEB reviews, the first of which will occur at 42 months after market
opening and will assess OPGI'S success in meeting the initial de-
control target on the marginal plants. The government has commit-
ted itself to this process by already issuing to the OEB formal direc-
tives and requests to undertake these reviews against the detailed
targets stipulated in the MDC'S Market Power Mitigation recommen-
dations.
In addition, draft elements of a memorandum of understanding
setting out the respective monitoring and enforcement responsibili-
ties of the Market Surveillance Panel of the IMO, the OEB, and the
federal Competition Bureau with respect to market abuses were
tentatively agreed to by the MDC, the OEB and the Bureau subject to
further refinements. This will be designed to minimize institutional
overlaps and maximize regulatory complementarities.
3. The Wholesale Market Design
The central task given to the MDC was to design detailed rules
for the Ontario wholesale electricity market. An initial, difficult
challenge was to determine which items should go into the rules and
which should be left to licenses, codes, or other instruments.
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Broadly speaking, the MDe drafted rules that address the follow-
ing issues: who is allowed to participate in the market and under
what conditions; what participants are allowed to do and what they
are prohibited from doing; how they make bids and offers; what
kind of products there are; how prices get calculated; how bills are
calculated and settled; how information is provided and used; and
many other matters. 16
In developing the rules, the MDC relied to a considerable extent
on the rules documents of the Australian State of Victoria, as well as
the rules of the England and Wales system. It also paid considerable
attention to the type of rules that exist, or are likely to be imple-
mented, in neighbouring electricity jurisdictions such as New York
and PJM (the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland system). The
MDC work proceeded in logical, step-wise fashion from "high-level"
design principles through to the production of over 300 pages of
detailed rules for the wholesale market.
One of its early decisions was that the Ontario market should
have a hybrid structure. It should consist of a voluntary "pool"
(i.e. a spot market, supplemented by financial contracts for differ-
ences), but should also permit physical bilateral contracting among
market participants subject to the equivalent treatment of bilateral
and spot market traders and to fair and reasonable allocation of the
costs of settlement systems.
Physical bilateral contracts are agreements between individual
buyers and sellers of electricity that, having informed the IMO, are
netted out of the IMO'S settlement process. In the case of a financial
bilateral contract, the full amount passes through the spot market
and is settled with the IMO; the two parties normally settle between
themselves for the difference between their contracted price and the
spot price. In the MDC recommendations, the parties to a physical
bilateral contract, who must be licensed market participants, will
inform the IMO in the predispatch process of the amount of energy
they have scheduled between them and the locations at which it
will be injected and withdrawn from the grid. Each site must also
independently specify 'increments and decrements', in effect telling
the IMO that if the market price in the dispatch reaches specific
levels, they would be prepared to add to, or subtract from, the
16. See Second Interim Report of MOC, c. 3; Final Report of MOC, c. 3, and vol. 2 (Draft
Market Rules).
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scheduled injections or withdrawals. Any deviations from the sched-
uled amounts would be settled with the IMO at the market price. The
selling participant must inform the IMO of the amount(s) to be
netted out of the IMO'S settlement process, identifying the specific
withdrawal locations and quantities. .
Market participants expressed a clear and strong preference for
a model that permits physical bilaterals. The MDC recommended a
hybrid market, based on the principle that traders should have maxi-
mum flexibility to structure commercial transactions in whatever
manner they regard as best. How much of their business they transact
through the spot market and how much through physical bilaterals
is entirely up to them. As noted, however, the MDC did recommend
two important limitations on the use of physical bilaterals, one to
ensure equal treatment of bilateral and spot traders, and one to
ensure that the costs of settling physical bilaterals at the retail level
are shared fairly.
It also recommended that the IMO should administer a voluntary,
day-ahead forward market for purely financial contracts, in addition
to the real-time (pre-dispatch) market. It concluded that such a
market could be run at minimal cost, and could provide a useful
hedging mechanism for market participants.
The MDC discussed the issue of generation capacity at consider-
able length. In a competitive market, no profit-maximizing generator
will want to hold idle or under-performing capacity. This creates
concerns that short-term capacity shortfalls could occur. The MDC
recommended that expected shortfalls in capacity be addressed
through a market in a new type of capacity reserve, which the IMO
could activate as and when necessary. The principle is that the
IMO should have the ability to intervene if an appropriate level of
investment is not forthcoming, provided the mechanism used re-
flects market-based principles and is not unduly intrusive. The IMO
will, of course, be disseminating information on the long-term mar-
ket outlook. Generators and transmission owners can use this infor-
mation to plan their investments. Ultimately, good information and
correct price signals are the keys for ensuring the timely expansion
of the system.
The MDC'S market design includes a bid-based market for certain
ancillary services that are needed to ensure system reliability, nota-
bly regulation and operating reserves. This recommendation illus-
trates a key point about the market design project: the "competitive
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market" is necessarily much broader than just a market in commod-
ity electricity.
From a technical point of view, there are many challenges in
running multiple, integrated markets in a manner that is fair and
efficient and ensures reliability. The market clearing logic the MDC
recommended uses a joint optimization procedure to handle this
problem. In the coming months, the market rules will need to be
adjusted to include regulation in the optimization procedure. The
market rules also accommodate the provision of ancillary services
to the IMO through competitively sourced contracts and must-run
contracts when local supply and reliability are an issue.
One of the MDC's key recommendations regarding the wholesale
market is that there should be a locationally uniform price for
electricity for the first 18 months of the market, but that, thereafter,
congestion pricing should be introduced, initially for wholesale mar-
ket participants and later, with OEB approval, for all retail end-use
customers.
When congestion occurs on a section of the transmission net-
work, higher-cost generation has to be substituted for the lower-
cost generation that would otherwise be used. For the first 18
months, the cost of this "redispatch" will be spread across all
customers and a uniform price will be maintained. Under conges-
tion pricing, energy prices would differ from place to place when-
ever congestion exists, reflecting the real-time marginal cost of
supplying energy at each point on the network.
The MDC strongly supported the principle of congestion pricing.
The point of introducing a market is to produce price signals that
lead to socially desirable decisions. Pricing for congestion ensures
more accurate price signals. Customers in an area experiencing
persistent congestion get a signal to alter their consumption level
and pattern; generators get a signal as to where they should build
and transmission owners and the regulator get a signal about where
.line improvements or expansions are most urgent. In short, pricing
for congestion is essential to secure economically rational invest-
ment decisions.
4. The Environment
The MDC'S terms of reference required it to consider appropriate
environmental protection measures in the design of the electricity
market. In the Moe's view, an air emissions cap and trade program
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should be launched at the same time as the electricity market is
opened to competition.17 Public acceptance of the electricity restruc-
turing initiative is tied intimately to the adoption of measures to
control power plant emissions and to otherwise protect and improve
the environment.
It also recommended that the market rules should allow green
power to be advertised and marketed to customers, subject to
development of a mechanism for verifying green power claims
and associated provisions in retailer licences. It also recommended
that all sellers of electricity to end-use customers provide informa-
tion on the generation source and the pollution emissions associ-
ated with that electricity. These recommendations are based on a
desire to ensure opportunities for environmentally friendly genera-
tion without compromising consumer protection. The MDC debated
at length the desirability of imposing minimum renewable portfolio
standards on generators but in the end did not recommend such a
requirement.
5. Transmission and Distribution
The MDC recommended four classes of transmission service for
inclusion in the market rules. 18 The principal class is basic network
service, which would be paid by all customers in Ontario. It con-
cluded that exports and wheel-through transactions should not be
charged in respect of the fixed costs of the transmission system.
However, the parties to such transactions would be required, like all
other bilateral traders, to pay any redispateh costs occasioned by
their transactions, plus line losses and a pro rata share of the IMO
costs. This recommendation has implications for Ontario's relation-
ships with neighbouring control areas, particularly in regard to the
treatment of wheel-throughs. The MDC recognized the need to con-
sider issues of reciprocity in the implementation of this proposal.
A significant policy challenge is posed by new relatively small-
scale generators that are built for self-supply or to supply the local
distribution company. On the one hand, such investments should
not be discouraged since new generation will be needed in the
future and investments in smaller scale generation are often envi-
ronmentally preferred. On the other hand, investments that would
17. Second Interim Report of MDC, c. 5; Final Report of MDC, c. 7.
18. Third Interim Report of MDC, c. 2; Final Report of MDC, c. 4.
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not otherwise be undertaken but are undertaken solely to avoid
transmission charges should not be encouraged. The economic
signals are clearly not correct if investors are building new genera-
tion with an all-in energy cost that is higher than the price of energy
obtainable from the grid. To deal with this issue of "uneconomic
bypass", the MDC proposed that transmission be charged on a gross
load basis, which means that market participants who install new
embedded generation after a defined date would pay for transmis-
sion on the basis of their demand inclusive of the amount supplied by
the new generation. This bypass issue is very important. Tolerating
incorrect prices and unfair cost shifting in the initial market design
could lead, in the long run, to resource misallocations that are no
less serious than those of the old monopoly regime.
Traditionally, investments in generation and transmission were
planned and implemented on an integrated basis by Ontario Hydro.
With the opening of the market, future generation investments will
be undertaken on a decentralized basis by competing firms. This
makes it necessary to rethink the process by which investments in
transmission will be made and how generation and transmission
expansions will be coordinated in a competitive market.
The MDC recommended that transmission investments continue
to be centrally planned during the initial years of the market, with a
major analytical and assessment role for the IMO and oversight by
the OEB. The costs of new investments would be rolled into the costs
to be recovered through the transmission tariff. However, the MDC
contemplated a need to move to a regime where transmission invest-
ments are market-driven. As noted above, congestion pricing is a
prerequisite for such an entrepreneurial approach. An entrepreneur-
ial approach also requires acceptance of the idea that the beneficiar-
ies of a transmission expansion should pay for it and have rights
with regard to its future use.
The MDC also dealt with a large number of technical issues
leading to rules for outage co-ordination and the calculation and
apportionment of line losses.
With regard to distribution, it addressed the separation of trans-
mission and distribution functions, and the separation of the distri-
bution wires business from the competitive retailing function,
reflecting the government's position in its White Paper that LDCs
should be required to form separate retail affiliates to undertake
competitive activities, leaving the natural monopoly distribution
function with the LDCS.
HeinOnline -- 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 177 2000
2000] Electricity Restructuring 177
6. Retail Competition
In its White Paper, the government announced its intention to
introduce full retail competition at the same time as wholesale
competition is introduced. This objective is designed to ensure that
every consumer in the province, irrespective of size or location,
immediately experiences the benefits of industry restructuring.
The OEB has responsibility for most of the key decisions that will
shape the nature of the retail electricity market, pursuant to the
Electricity Act, 1998. Given the MDC'S terms of reference and the
need for compatibility between the wholesale and retail markets, the
MDC undertook to provide the OEB with a substantial volume of
research and advice about the retail market. 19
The MDC'S key retail initiative was to require local distribution
companies to pass through the wholesale spot market price to end-
use consumers. This is critical to ensuring that the long-term price
reductions expected from introducing competition at the wholesale
level flow through to customers, including those who choose to
remain on default supply (i.e. do not elect supply from another
retailer). If the benefits of reform are not fully passed through, then
the restructuring will have failed in one of its key objectives.
The MDC recommended that default supply for those who stay
with their traditional supplier be provided on the basis of a smoothed
(averaged) spot market price, with true-ups on a defined schedule.
The smoothing methodology and time period would be the same for
all default suppliers in the province.
By averaging over multiple billing periods, the smoothed spot
option has the advantage of mitigating the cash flow impact of
market price volatility on consumers. But, at the same time, it
maintains a clear connection to the spot price, giving customers a
reason to think about energy conservation and a benchmark against
which they can judge some of the supply options that competitive
retailers in their area may offer.
The pass through of the spot price is critical to the exercise of
genuine customer choice at the retail level. Distributor licences
should require the distributor, at a customer's request, to send the
customer's spot-priced bill to a competitive retailer named by the
customer. The retailer would then pay the distributor's bill, and
19. Second Interim Report of MDC, c. 4; Third Interim Report of MDC, c. 3; Final Report of
MDC, c. 6; Retail Technical Panel, vol. 4 of Final Report of MDC.
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settle up with the customer on the basis agreed between the two of
them. The bill, which reflects the customer's usage and the
weighted hourly spot price, is the foundation on which customers
and retailers can negotiate competitive supply contracts. Using
the information on the bill, they can settle between themselves
according to whatever terms and conditions they have agreed upon.
For example, a consumer seeking strong protection against future
price increases could negotiate a fixed-price contract with a com-
petitive retailer. A customer who prefers no price averaging at all
could negotiate simply to pay the actual spot price over the billing
period. Such contracts are easily written and settled, given the
initial bill. The customers are able to exercise choice and select
the combination of price and risk that they are most comfortable
with. In addition, competitive retailers may offer other value-
added services that would not otherwise be available. The MDC'S
recommendations allow for alternative billing options, such that the
customer could interact exclusively with the retailer, exclusively
with the distributor, or with the former for energy and the latter for
wires charges. These are refinements that increase market flexibility
at minimal cost beyond that of customer education. The MOC also
developed a number of recommendations related to the customer
transfer process.
The Electricity Act, 1998 permits default supply and competi-
tive services to be provided by the same corporate entity. Some of
the MDe members believed that it makes good business sense to
organize their affairs this way. Others were concerned about the
incremental regulatory burden that will likely be involved in ensur-
ing that the bundling of these activities in a single entity does not
result in significant discriminatory or anti-competitive behaviour.
The MOC'S recommendations addressed the risks to the market of
two key types of anti-competitive behaviour: cross-subsidization of
competitive businesses by monopoly businesses and preferential
access by affiliated competitive businesses to default customer in-
formation. The MOC considered at length the question of how default
customers are served if the local distributors provide default supply
through their retail affiliate or a third party that provides competitive
electricity services. It was concerned that transfer of customer data
to an affiliate or a third party could unduly advantage the affiliate or
third party, thereby discouraging the entry of new competitive retail-
ers and effectively denying consumers the real choice the govern-
ment has promised them. This was one of the very few issues on
which the MOC was unable to achieve substantial consensus.
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One of the more technical issues addressed on the retail side
concerned the retail settlements system and specifically how cus-
tomers' hourly consumption will be estimated, given that few
customers will initially have interval (hourly) meters. An estima-
tion technique is needed because bills will be computed using
hourly spot market prices. The MDC decided in favour of the net
system load shape. The net system load shape is basically the hourly
profile that is left when the hourly consumption of all interval
metered customers is subtracted from the distributor's hourly pur-
chases from the !MO. Importantly, competitive retailers will not be
permitted to compete by offering alternative profiles.
Over the longer term, advances in metering technology will be
an important factor affecting the depth of the retail market. The
MDC recommended that the retail metering market should be opened
to competition for customers above 50-kw consumption in the first
year, with the OEB to determine within three years whether further
unbundling would be of benefit to small volume customers, which is
likely largely to tum on innovations and declining costs in metering
technology.
The Retail Technical Panel advised that, for practical reasons
and under current federal law, metering would have to be provided
through either the distributor or a retailer. It would not be possible,
at least in the period immediately ahead, to have metering compa-
nies directly approaching retail customers. However, it will be a
significant step in the right direction if distributors begin to con-
tract out significant amounts of their metering work to competitive
suppliers.
As in the wholesale market context, many issues around confi-
dentiality and access to data were explored. While recognizing that
a robust retail market depends on significant data being available
to competitive retailers, the MDC firmly favoured consumer protec-
tion and privacy. The success of the market will depend in large part
on the existence of conservative procedures that minimize the risks
of customer data being transferred without clear and explicit cus-
tomer authorization. Similarly, there should be strict controls to
prevent the unauthorized transfer of customers from one business
entity to another. Consumers should always have the right to access
their basic information such as the records on their meter reads or
their payment history. While this is generally the case now, the
policy should be enshrined by the OEB through licences to ensure
that competitive retailers are covered. Another key recommendation
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was that no entity be able to use basic consumer information for
secondary purposes unless the consumer explicitly agrees in writing
to such use.
Consumer protection goes hand in hand with consumer educa-
tion. A great deal of work needs to be done to ensure that consum-
ers are ready for the commencement of retail competition in
November 2000. Consumers need to be informed of how the new
system will work and of their rights and responsibilities. The
Retail Technical Panel provided an extensive list of the kinds of
information that customers will need in order to understand and
evaluate their options.20 Among other things, the MIX recommended
that the OEB be responsible for ensuring that educational information
is available to consumers on an ongoing basis. Distributors, as
a condition of licence, would be required to distribute consumer
education materials issued by the OEB or the Ministry of Energy,
Science and Technology.
III. PROVISIONAL LESSONS FROM THE ONTARIO EXPERIENCE
In terms of provisional lessons that might be drawn for electric-
ity restructuring initiatives from the Ontario experience to date,
including in particular the extensive deliberations that occurred
within the MIX around central issues of contention and from reviews
undertaken by or on behalf of the MDe of experience in other
jurisdictions relating to these issues, we identify the following short
list of key design issues that are likely to prove difficult to resolve
in any electricity restructuring but which are also likely to prove
key determinants of the success of efforts to create a competitive
electricity industry.21
1. Management of the Market
It is a truism to state that markets, at least markets as complex
as network markets for electricity, rarely exist in a state of nature
and typically require a sophisticated supporting infrastructure that
defines and allocates property rights to various resources and pro-
vides for their enforcement and transferability. These entitlements
20. Volume 4 of Final Report of MOC.
21. Much of the following discussion has been influenced by a recent highly insightful and
illuminating paper by Larry Ruff (Senior Economic Consultant to the MOC), "Competi-
tive Electricity Markets: Why They are Working and How to Improve Them", supra,
footnote 1.
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extend well beyond commodity electricity to various ancillary
services and reserves and transmission rights. Under the traditional
vertically integrated monopoly model, in contrast to competitive
markets in these resources, little attention had to be paid to these
issues as they were addressed internally through various forms of
command-and-control or hierarchical decision-making - a kind
of central planning model- often subject to some form of external
regulatory oversight. The complexity and detail of both the market
rules to be administered by the IMO and regulatory licence condi-
tions to be administered by the Ontario Energy Board in order to
induce the emergence of an efficient, competitive market are striking
and indeed daunting.
With respect to the role of the IMO in managing the wholesale
market, threshold issues of some contention that the MOC was re-
quired to address related to both the functions and governance of the
IMO (in other jurisdictions often referred to as the Independent
System Operator (Iso». Two core functions will be performed by
the IMO, both of which were subject to vigorous debate within the
MOC: (a) operating a wholesale spot market and (b) performing the
dispatch function. Arguments were made to the MOC by various
market intermediaries that these functions should be separated and
that short-term trading should be left to private markets and private
contracting. However, the MOC was persuaded that the dispatch
function could not be performed efficiently without the IMO also
managing the short-term physical spot market, given the need to
coordinate real-time operation of the system with contractual com-
mitments· typically made in advance of real time operating decisions.
California's efforts to separate the dispatch function from the opera-
tion of short-term spot markets has proven problematic, and recent
proposals by the electricity regulator in Britain to dispense with an
integrated wholesale power pool have proven highly contentious. It
should be added that the fact that the IMO is to operate an integrated
wholesale power pool (spot market) with its dispatch function does
not preclude other short-term trading arrangements outside of the
pool, including financial transactions such as contracts for differ-
ences and physical bilaterals. However, the integrated spot market
should provide an efficient set of reference prices for these other
transactions and if it is operating efficiently it should probably limit
the scope or demand for extensive collateral short-term trading
arrangements.
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Another point of contention that the MDe was required to address
related to the IMO dispatch function. In order to manage efficiently
the physical operation of the power system and the complex network
externalities that power systems entail, the IMO must have significant
authority over the day-to-day physical operations of the entire sys-
tem, including in particular the transmission grid. This led the MDC
to recommend that the IMO negotiate an operating agreement with
the transmission grid owners that would specify respective realms
of responsibility over the transmission system and related compen-
sation and liability arrangements. This was a decision that the suc-
cessor corporation to Ontario Hydro's transmission grid initially
strongly resisted, although eventually a mutually satisfactory draft
operating agreement between the IMO and Ontario Hydro Services
Company Incorporated was negotiated under the auspices of the
MDC.
A final core set of issues relating to the management of the
wholesale market entailed the resolution of a variety ofgovernance
issues relating to the IMO. One possible governance model would
be a kind of co-operative or stakeholder model, where various con-
stituencies would elect or appoint representatives to the board of the
IMO and its key committees. Another model would contemplate a
completely independent board, presumably appointed by govern-
ment. In the end, the MDC recommended a blend of these two models
with key constituencies electing their nominees to the board of the
IMO and its key committees, and the Minister appointing a signifi-
cant minority of independent directors. 22 Whether this intermediate
governance model will prove effective is a matter on which judg-
ment at this point would be premature, although in many respects it
resembles the model of the MDC itself, which proved reasonably
effective in designing the key features of a competitive electricity
market in Ontario.
2. Transmission Congestion
In most relatively self-contained vertically integrated monopoly
electricity systems, incumbents have typically reported that issues
of transmission congestion are of minor significance. They have
22. See James Baker. Bernard Tenenbaum, and Fiona Woolf. "Governance and Regulation
of Power Pools and System Operators: An International Comparison" (World Bank
Discussion Paper. September 1997).
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been dealt with through internal planning and operational pro-
cesses. However, experience from other jurisdictions that have
undertaken competitively oriented electricity restructurings sug-
gests that in more decentralized competitive environments entail-
ing investment and production decisions by a multitude of actors
on both the supply and demand sides of the market, transmission
congestion can rapidly become a serious problem.23 Short of giving
the IMO a large command-and-control responsibility for resolving
these problems, which in fundamental respects is incompatible with
the development of competitive markets, there is no alternative but
to move to some form of locational pricing, such as zonal or nodal
pricing. This is likely to prove a highly sensitive political issue (as
it has in other utility sectors that have been deregulated such as
telecommunications), as it renders explicit a variety of cross-subsid-
ies that were largely hidden in the operations and pricing structures
of vertically integrated electricity monopolies. In the case of On-
tario, the Ontario government in its White Paper committed itself to
maintaining (uniform) electricity prices, posing a major challenge
for the MDC in formulating viable solutions to potential problems of
transmission congestion. These issues engaged extensive discussion
within the MDC and with the Ministry of Energy, Science and Tech-
nology. In the end, the MDC recommended a phased implementation
approach to locational pricing with uniform transmission prices for
a short period after market opening, then locational pricing on either
a nodal or zonal basis for wholesale consumers, and then locational
pricing for all consumers, including retail consumers, subject to
further review by the Ontario Energy Board. In order to cushion the
effects of locational pricing on consumers in remote areas, the
government committed itself to maintaining its existing Rural Rate
Assistance Programme of direct subsidies to existing groups of rural
consumers but without any necessary commitment to providing such
subsidies to future residents in these areas.
3. Investment in Generation Capacity
A persistent concern in jurisdictions that have undertaken com-
petitively oriented electricity restructuring is whether competitive
electricity markets will attract adequate investment in generation
capacity, in particular peaking and reserve capacity that may only
23. Ruff, supra, footnote I, at pp. 23-27.
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need to be deployed episodically (e.g. after failure of a generating
unit or transmission line). Energy prices accurately reflecting such
effects would have to be determined every few seconds (at every
location, in principle) and would have to increase to many thou-
sands of times normal levels during critical seconds.24 Hourly
energy prices by definition cannot provide price signals concerning
events within the hour and tend to be below the average of the
correct instantaneous prices over the hour, particularly during criti-
cal hours when peak capacity is needed. The ability of a load to take
power from the grid without a prior contract with a generator in
these circumstances creates a potential network externality that may
lead to lack of voltage support, brown-outs, or at the limit system
failure. Even if it were possible to solve the problem of generating
instantaneous prices, political resistance to very high price spikes
during moments of critical shortages leading to concerns of "goug-
ing" or costly or disruptive load shedding may make it infeasible to
rely on commodity price signals alone to resolve the capacity prob-
lem. As Ruffnotes,25 experience with competitive electricity systems
has buried the bogeyman that nobody will invest in power plants
without long-term contracts. Systems based on spot markets with no
long-term contracts have seen large amounts of new generation
investment (including Chile, Argentina, Peru, and England and
Wales). However, in other systems (e.g. Alberta and Victoria), inade-
quate generating capacity, in particular peaking capacity, has proven
a problem.
One response to this problem is that the IMO could impose
installed capacity requirements where market participants are re-
quired to provide or pay for more generation capacity and more
peaking capacity in particular than is commercially justified based
on the hourly energy prices alone. This could be done, for example,
by imposing an annual capacity requirement on each retailer equal
to that retailer's projected peak demand over the upcoming year
plus a margin reflecting uncertainty about demand and generation
availability, implying that retailers bidding for generation capacity
and contracts to meet their capacity requirements will provide addi-
tional income to generators beyond hourly energy prices. Alterna-
tively, the IMO can institute a capacity market in which it will pay
generators for maintaining operating reserves that can be called on
24. Ibid., at p. 28.
25. Ibid., at p. 27.
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quickly to deal with supply shortfalls. These capacity payments
would take the form of an hourly energy price "adder". When there
is plenty of capacity relative to the demand, the price of operating
reserve will be small or zero, but when capacity becomes tighter,
these payments will need to be increased to induce investments in
additional capacity. The MIX: recommended that the lMO be vested
with the authority to institute a capacity market if it determines that
capacity, in particular peaking capacity, has become too tight. In this
event, the market would determine a combination of an hourly
energy price and an hourly capacity price that clears each hour.
4. Market Power in the Generation Segment
In competitively oriented electricity restructurings that begin (as
they typically do) with an incumbent vertically integrated monop-
oly, most jurisdictions have encountered serious market power
problems in their generation segments during the transition period
to a competitively structured industry.26 Even in jurisdictions like
England and Wales, where breakup and privatization of the existing
generating plants of the incumbent state-owned monopolist were
undertaken at the outset of the restructuring exercise, market power
problems have persisted despite further divestitures required by the
regulator and have led to the imposition of temporary price caps by
the regulatorY In Ontario, this is a particularly serious problem
given that the successor corporation to Ontario Hydro's generation
facilities, OPGl, currently accounts for about 90% of electricity sup-
plied to the Ontario market, and given the technical constraints
on inter-tie capacity with neighbouring jurisdictions that limit the
amount of electricity that can be supplied by these jurisdictions at
present to about 25% of Ontario demand.
Most of the MOC members strongly favoured ex ante structural
solutions to this problem, but the government in its White Paper
took the position that no further reorganization of Ontario Hydro's
assets, beyond creating the two successor corporations, was contem-
plated at this time, thus ruling out more radical and straightforward
26. See Michael Trebilcock and Michal Gal, "Market Power in Electricity Industry Restruc-
turings" (1999), 22 World Competition 119; and Ronald Binz and Mark Frankena,
"Addressing Market Power: The Next Step in Electricity Restructuring", Policy Paper,
Competition Policy Institute (Washington, DC, 1998).
27. See John Kwoka, ''Transforming Power: Lessons From British Electricity Restructur-
ing" (1997), Regulation (Summer) 47.
HeinOnline -- 33 Can. Bus. L.J. 186 2000
186 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 33
structural solutions involving breakup, divestiture, and privatization
for the time being. These kinds of structural options are, of course,
matters of high politics within the province. Ontario Hydro's work-
force is highly unionized and the Power Workers Union early in
the current government's tenure ran high profile media campaigns
decrying radical structural options. In addition, many Canadian na-
tionalists are vehemently opposed to so-called "heritage assets"
(such as Niagara Falls) falling into foreign hands, while many other
citizens are concerned that private operators of Ontario Hydro's fleet
of nuclear power plants may have stronger economic incentives to
chisel on appropriate investments in maintenance, safety, waste
disposal and decommissioning (although Ontario Hydro's recent
record in operating these plants has perhaps assuaged these con-
cerns).
The MDC spent a large amount of time wrestling with these issues.
Part way through its mandate, it sought and obtained from the
government authority to embark upon a set of negotiations with
Ontario Hydro around certain key elements in a market power
mitigation strategy that would entail price constraints on Ontario
Hydro in the short-run, pending achievement of certain medium and
longer term targets in terms of transferring effective control through
one mechanism or another to third parties of substantial shares of
its generating output required to service Ontario demand. These
negotiations were protracted, complex, and contentious, rendered
more difficult by various trade-offs confronting the government.
These included a desire to minimize Ontario Hydro's stranded costs
and hence the need for a substantial stranded debt charge (in effect
a tax) to cover these costs, given the government's general political
commitment to tax reduction in the province. Hence there was a·
desire to capitalize the successor corporations to Ontario Hydro with
as much debt as they could carry, which in tum requires .higher
assured revenue streams, which are likely to be inconsistent with
achieving competitive and less predictable electricity prices. In tum,
many independent power producers were critical of efforts by the
MDC to constrain Ontario Hydro's prices to below monopoly levels
in the short-run through price caps on the grounds that these con-
strained prices would render new independent investment in generat-
ing capacity economically less feasible than being able to price at or
just below Ontario Hydro's monopoly pricing umbrella. On the
other hand, industrial, commercial, and residential consumers were
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inclined to view solutions to the market power problems short of
radical ex ante structural solutions as temporizing with the problem.
An alternative solution may have been to set a higher price cap
(e.g., 4.5 rather than 3.8 cents per kwlh), to eliminate the estimated
0.6 cent stranding tax (the Competition Transition Charge), and to
load up OPGI with a higher debt burden reflecting a higher expected
revenue stream. However, several difficulties emerged with this
option. First, a price cap is not a price guarantee and if OPGI could
not in fact realize an average price of 4.5 cents per kwlh (which
MDC and OPGI's modelling exercises suggested doubts about), the
government as its shareholder could face the prospect of a major
corporate financial crisis. Second, even if OPGI could exercise suffi-
cient market power to realize 4.5 cents per kwlh (and was capitalized
accordingly), it would have severe disincentives to implement struc-
tural measures that would be likely to undermine its future ability to
maintain this price level. Third, to rely on green-field entry as an
effective source of competitive discipline on OPGI'S prices, given the
lags involved in major new investments and OPGI'S high market
share, would leave in place an uncompetitive market for an extended
future period. Finally, lack of adequate generating capacity has not
been a problem in Ontario: indeed, many of Ontario Hydro's finan-
cial problems are attributable to over-investment in system capacity,
subject to recent questions about the reliability of a number of its
nuclear generating plants. Thus, transferring effective control of
substantial portions of its existing generating facilities to potential
competitors as quickly as economically and politically feasible is a
more effective structural solution. Allowing OPGI to retain the pro-
ceeds from disposition and to acquire assets elsewhere would be an
important inducement to move quickly in this direction.
Despite these cross-cutting factors and interests, the MDC mem-
bers unanimously agreed (with greater or lesser enthusiasm) to the
package of proposals described earlier in this article which were
reduced to a detailed formal agreement between the MDC and On-
tario Hydro by the end of the MDC'S mandate, endorsed by the
Minister and embodied in a detailed directive and request by the
Minister to the Ontario Energy Board to oversee the attainment
by OPGI of the stipulated de-control targets. How effective these
proposals will prove in mitigating OPGI'S market power remains to
be seen, although it is abundantly clear that the success or failure of
the competitive electricity market in Ontario largely turns on their
efficacy. We personally would prefer to see the early privatization
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of OPGI through a broadly held public offering (much as in the case
of recent privatization of the Canadian National Railroad), subject
to an accelerated form of the market power mitigation constraints
described above. It will become increasingly inappropriate in a
competitive Ontario market and in expanding into other markets by
exports or acquisitions of generating facilities for OPOI to be either
constrained or assisted by state ownership.
5. Retail Competition
Ensuring the benefits of effective retail competition, especially
for small volume residential consumers, has proven a more daunt-
ing challenge than ensuring effective wholesale competition in
most jurisdictions that have undertaken competitively oriented
electricity restructuring. 28 Partly this is a function of the high cost
of the sophisticated (interval) metering and complex settlement and
reconciliation systems usually thought to be necessary to allow retail
competition. Partly it is a function of the relative size of transaction
and switching costs for both retailers and consumers of small vol-
umes of electricity. Partly it is a function of the political imperative
in many jurisdictions of retaining a captive consumer base that can
bear (disproportionately) stranding costs. Where wholesale competi-
tion has been introduced, the largest industrial customers usually
have had sufficient political influence, credible commercial options
and technical capabilities that they are able to obtain access to
electricity at essentially the wholesale price. Medium size industrial
and commercial consumers usually get access to such prices some-
what later, and small retail consumers much later again.
In Ontario, the government in its White Paper committed itself
to introducing wholesale and full retail competition simultaneously
when the market opens in November 2000. Thus, the challenge for
the MDC (and subsequently the OEB) has been to devise a regime that
will ensure effective retail competition, even for small customers,
immediately when the wholesale market opens. This objective
largely precluded establishing as preconditions the installation of
sophisticated interval metering devices in all residential homes or
establishing complex settlement and reconciliation procedures be-
tween retailers and local distribution companies. In order to ensure
that all retail consumers immediately have access to wholesale
28. See Ruff, supra, footnote I, at pp. 33-39.
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prices, the MOC recommended that LOCs be required to pass through
to all retail customers electricity at wholesale prices, plus a small
administrative charge to cover billing, metering and bad debt costs.
Retail prices will, in effect, be the spot prices established in the
power pool and will be subject to greater volatility than retail con-
sumers have previously experienced. Hence, the MDC contemplated
some form of smoothed wholesale spot price pass-through, although
even short-term smoothing will leave consumers exposed to more
price volatility than in the past. The MDC'S proposals contemplate
that independent retailers or the competitive retailing affiliates of
LDCS would be able to compete for retail customers by offering
different contractual terms and other value-added retail services: In
the event of a retail customer entering into a contract with an
independent retailer or the competitive retailing affiliate of an LDC,
the LDC would simply redirect, at the customer's direction, the
latter's spot price bill to the retailer for payment, while the retailer
would settle up with the customer on whatever terms have been
contractually agreed to. These proposals preclude LDCs leveraging
their market power in the wires business (which would remain
subject to performance-based regulation by the OEB) into the elec-
tricity retailing segment by charging monopoly mark-ups on the
commodity itself, or alternatively requiring detailed regulation of
retail commodity prices by the OEB.
These proposals engendered significant opposition from the
LDCS (MEUS) in two respects. First, they would have preferred to
offer fixed price contracts, as the default supply option, to retail
customers. Second, a number of LDCs wish to maintain the option
of assigning to their competitive retail affiliates default supply cus-
tomers and providing the wholesale spot price pass-through default
supply option through these affiliates. While the MDC, by substantial
consensus, rejected the first proposal, it was unable to reach
agreement on whether LDCs should be permitted to meet default
supply obligations through their competitive retail affiliates and this
issue is currently before the Ontario Energy Board for resolution.
On the first proposal, most of the MDC members thought it inappro-
priate and antithetical to effective retail competition that LDCs,
through their wires companies, should be assuming pricing risks by
entering into fixed price contracts that may prove to be at variance
with prevailing wholesale prices and imputing the cost of bearing
these risks to their monopoly wires business. As to the second
proposal, while if adopted it would clearly increase the value of
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these affiliates of LDCs by assigning to them initially a large retail
customer base and hence increasing the market value and perhaps
saleability of these retail affiliates, a number of MDC members were
concerned that this would provide these affiliates of the LDCs with
preferential access to consumers and consumer information relative
to independent retailers and exacerbate market-power problems in
the retail segment of the market. Independent retailers, while sharing
this latter concern, appear to be opposed to the wholesale spot price
default supply option, in that it leaves very few incentives for retail
consumers to search out better retail options dsewhere, given that it
seems unlikely that independent retailers can systematically beat the
wholesale spot price, limiting independent retailers to ·providing
contractual offerings designed to reduce price risk or volatility for
retail consumers, plus other value-added services such as various
energy conservation mechanisms.
Thus, despite the MDC's efforts to formulate a relatively simple,
"fast start" form of retail competition for small volume consumers,
important features of the MDC's proposals remain contested, and will
require resolution by the OEB in the near future before the market
opens.
6. The Reform Process
The reform process itself in Ontario holds out potentially inter-
esting and useful lessons for major public policy reforms in re-
flecting on the relationship between ideas, interests and institutions
in the policy process.29 First, it appears to be the case that often a
major crisis is required in order to undermine public confidence in
existing policies and institutional arrangements and create a re-
ceptiveness to major policy alternatives. Second, while a crisis pres-
ents opportunities for new ideas about new or old issues, it also
presents dangers of precipitate or ill-considered action that may
simply exacerbate the underlying causes of the crisis. Third, new
ideas, without the support of political interests, are unlikely to make
much political headway, so that ideally the reform process requires a
judicious and delicate balancing of new ideas and effective political
interests, including interests (such as demand-side interests) that
29. See Michael Trebilcock and Ron Daniels, "Journeys Across the Institutional Divides:
Reinterpreting the Reinventing Government Movement", Working Paper, University of
Toronto Law School, 1999.
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may have been marginalized in pre-existing institutional arrange-
ments. The composition of the MDe with 14 stakeholder representa-
tives and an independent executive and a major international lead
consulting firm retained by the executive reflected an attempt to
strike this balance. Despite pessimistic prognostications by the busi-
ness press on the appointment of the MDC that it would "die the
death of a 1,000 cuts" through impasses on all important decisions,
this in most cases proved not to be the case, and indeed the bottom-
up design of the competitive electricity market attracted much less
public rancour and divisiveness than the government's top-down
efforts to restructure municipal government in Toronto and school
boards and hospitals throughout Ontario. The lesson here may be
that within a broad (but not aphoristic) policy mandate established
by government (e.g. wholesale and retail competition by the year
2000), the detailed design of policy instruments for realizing this
broad objective may well, in many cases, most productively be
remitted to a combination of representatives of affected stakeholder
groups and independent analysts with the objectivity, detachment
and credibility to promote new ideas for resolving new or old issues
with a recommendatory relationship to government that remains
ultimately accountable for the reform process. This process is a form
of regulatory negotiation ("reg neg"), as recent U.S. administrative
law literature refers to it,30 in contrast to legislative or command-
and-control policy-making. While there are obvious dangers with
regulatory negotiation, such as excessive influence by well-re-
sourced interests, exclusion of relevant interests and analytical per-
spectives from the process, unprincipled or policy-incoherent
compromises and lack of transparency, we believe that these dangers
can be minimized and that the process has many offsetting virtues.
Fourth, beyond the initial reform process, the design of ongoing
institutions for implementing and adapting the proposed reforms (in
this case, in particular the IMO) requires a similarly judicious and
delicate balancing of interests and ideas in the composition of the
governance structures and design of the decision rules for these
institutions if regulatory impasses are to be avoided and the potential
for both ongoing stakeholder confidence and policy innovation is to
be maximized.
These are the lessons that we draw to this juncture from the
Ontario experience with electricity restructuring. We emphasize
30. See Twenty-eighth Annual Administrative Law Issue (1997), 46 Duke L.J. 1255-1473.
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that these lessons are necessarily tentative and are really in the
nature of a progress report. While plans for the advent of wholesale
and retail competition in Ontario in the year 2000 appear to be
proceeding relatively smoothly and on schedule, real-life markets
have a habit of yielding unpredictable surprises - some pleasant
and some unpleasant - so that firm conclusions on how well
Ontario has managed the transition from monopoly to competition
in electricity must necessarily await the accumulation of a worth-
while body of hard evidence from real, not paper, markets. Never-
theless, we remain cautiously optimistic.
We close this review Of the Ontario experience to date with
electricity restructuring with one final and abiding thought from
our involvement in the restructuring process: an immense amount
of effort and human and other resources is required to design
the ground rules and institutional infrastructure for competitive
markets in network industries as physically and technologically
complex as electricity. Contrasting the complexities, inefficiencies
and distortions of regulated industries with the simplicity and
efficiency of state-of-nature competitive markets (as some econo-
mists are wont do) completely obscures this basic truth. As Profes-
sor William Hogan of Harvard University (an internationally
acknowledged economic expert on electricity restructuring) re-
marked at the Toronto Conference referred to above, not regulating
electricity prices requires an extraordinary commitment of effort
that may be comparable to the amount of effort required to regulate
prices (although hopefully more productively directed).
